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IS AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN MONEY UNDER
FALSE PRETENSES A COMMON-LOW CRIME?
GERALD L. STAPP
of the Denver Bar
In the case of People v. Dolph1 , it was decided by the Supreme
Court that a common law crime of England, unknown before the
year 1607, is not a crime in Colorado. Dr. H. C. Dolph, Denver
city councilman, was charged by information with the crime of
attempting to obtain money by false pretenses and of other crimes
not herein discussed. The people presented evidence to show that
the defendant held himself out to Aziel Stein, complaining witness,
as being in a position to either increase or diminish the possibility
of a favorable reception by the Manager of Safety of a liquor li-
cense application submitted by the owners of the Continental
Drug Store. Dolph approached Stein and offered his good offices
in exchange for a small gift. The complaining witness, father of
one of the owners of the drug store, contacted public authorities
and arranged for representatives of the District Attorney's office
to be present when he exchanged a gift of $500 for Dr. Dolph's
promised good offices. After the money was handed to the de-
fendant, he was immediately arrested by representatives of the
District Attorney's office. Defendant was acquitted on a motion
for a directed verdict.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The
principal issue was whether there existed in Colorado a common
law crime of an attempt to obtain money under false pretences.
It was contended by the defense that such a common law crime
must have existed in England by 1607 in order for the defendant
to be criminally liable, because the Colorado constitution 2 adopted
only the English common law which existed in England as of 1607.
It was urged by the People, first, that a general doctrine of criminal
attempts existed in Colorado common law; second, that the crime
of an attempt to obtain money by false pretences existed before
1607 in English common law; and third, that assuming that such
a crime did not exist before the year 1607 the Colorado court was
not bound to look only to decisions rendered prior to the year 1607.
The people contended that the common law was not static and that
it continued to change with passing years. Thus it was urged upon
the court that it could look to subsequent English decisions for
guidance.
In support of its contention that a general doctrine of criminal
attempt exists in Colorado, the People cited the dictum in the ma-
jority opinion of Compton v. People which declared that: "An
information necessarily charges an attempt to commit such a
1 The decision in this case was handed down on December 17, 1951.
2 '35 C.S.A., 159, Sec.1.
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crime. It is admitted that under the common law, an attempt to
commit a crime is equally indictable as a consumated crime."P3
This view was not accepted by the Colorado Supreme Court. The
early case of Chilcott v. Hart4 embodied the view that the common
law was flexible, dynamic, and constantly changing. The court said
in this case that:
Since this court was first constituted, it has been en-
forcing the common law of England, so far as applicable
and of a general nature, and in ascertaining what the
common law is has repeatedly consulted, and referred
with approval to, the decisions of the English courts ren-
dered since, as well as prior to the year 1607, without in-
quiring whether the doctrine of the cases subsequent to
that date differed from the common law as found in the
decisions prior thereto.' (Italics added)
It should be noted, however, that the Chilcott case was concerned
only with an estate matter. It remained for the court to de-
termine whether this broad doctrine should be extended to en-
compass criminal law. Had the court elected to extend the effect
of the Chilcott case to criminal law, it would have found that a
general doctrine of criminal attempt existed in England in about
the year 1784.
THE ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE
There is a considerable conflict of authority among text
writers as to the date of birth of the doctrine of criminal attempt
in England. Coke and Staunford cite a few cases to support their
contention that such a doctrine was first evolved in the latter part
of the fourteenth century. 6 The decisions in these cases were
generally based on mere intent to do the deed. No heed was paid
to the absence of any act designed by the actor to implement this
intent. The intent was sufficient. Reeves and Pollock and Mait-
land concur in the view that this doctrine had fallen into disrepute
by 1500. 7 The last two authors go further than Reeves and declare
that "Ancient law has as a general rule no punishment for those
who have tried to do harm but have not done it."
Professor Sayre's monumental treatment of this doctrine
rejects the date picked by Coke and Staunford. He places the
birth of this doctrine in the year 1784, when Lord Mansfield an-
nounced in Rex v. Scofield the first clear formulation of a doctrine
of criminal attempt.9 In this case the court held that an attempt
to burn a house, even though frustrated before damage is done, is
' 84 Colorado 111 (1928).
4 23 Colorado 40 (1896).
'23 Colorado 47.
Staunford, Pleas of the Crown (1557), p. 27, and Coke, Third Institute 69
(1644) as cited by Francis Sayre, "The Doctrine of Criminal Attempt," 41
Harvard Law Review 622-23 (1928).
'3 Reeves History of English Law, (2nd Ed.) 413; 2 Pollock and Maitland,
History of English Law, (2nd Ed. 1923) 508.
6Pollock and Maitland, supra, N. 7, footnote 4, pp. 508-09.
'Sayre, supra, N. 6, pp. 822-23.
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criminally punishable. Lord Mansfield pointed out that bare in-
tention is not sufficient to constitute a criminal offense, yet when
this malicious and unlawful intent is coupled with an act designed
to further this intent, the act becomes criminal and punishable.
The doctrine of criminal attempt was firmly established by the
year 1837 so that Baron Parke was able to declare in Rex v.
Roderick that "an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is a mis-
demeanor, whether the offense is created by statute, or was an
offense at common law."'1 The better authority seems to point to
the conclusion that a doctrine of criminal attempt did not exist
as a part of the English common law through the year 1607.
In concluding, it is clear that the Colorado court has not
chosen to follow the lead of the English courts. No new commo4
law crimes will be added to that body of English common law
which was adopted as it existed in 1607. The court seems to be
following the trend toward abolition of common law crimes com-
pletely, which has been accomplished by leglislative act in several
states. The court indicates that only civil aspects of the common
law will continue to be dynamic and constantly changing.
THE TAXPAYER'S MOTIVE
VICTORIA M. DOWNS *
Visintainer v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue' is a
tenth circuit case decided last March. That an equitable result
was reached, is indisputable, but the successful outcome seems
to have been reached despite, rather than because of, the applica-
tion by the court of an anomalous philosophy presently rampant
in the realm of taxation. Legal concepts when interpreted in tax
contexts are sometimes metamorphosed to such an extent that
although they may bear the same nomenclature as in other fields
of the law, they are opposed in essence. By interpolating the phrase,
"for tax purposes" the courts supplant time honored principles
and precedents, and such concepts as "gifts", "trusts", "corpora-
tions", and "partnerships" may assume entirely new definitions.
Nor are their tax-wise meanings necessarily consistent with each
other, for the standard which guides the courts is not always an
objective one, but is dependent on the taxpayer's subjective atti-
tude, labeled by the court as his "motive". Such relativism in the
application of justice is contrary to the tenets of a system, the
essence of which is a government by laws not subject to change
in each distinct context.
In the Visintainer case, the taxpayer, Louis Visintainer,
brought petition against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to have reviewed a decision of the Tax Court of the United States 2
approving an income tax deficiency for the period January 1 to
107 C&P 795, 179 Eng. Rep. 347 (1837).
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
187 F. 2d 519 (1951).
'13 T.C. 805 (1951).
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